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a b s t r a c t 
The aggregate Lerner index is a popular composite measure of multi-product banks’ market power, based 
on total assets as the single aggregate output factor. We show that the aggregate Lerner index only quali- 
fies as a consistently aggregated Lerner index if three conditions hold. Under these conditions, the aggre- 
gate Lerner index reduces to a weighted-average of the product-specific Lerner indices. We test the three 
conditions for a sample of U.S. banks covering the years 2011–2017. All three conditions are rejected and 
we show that they may cause an economically relevant bias to the aggregate Lerner index, depending 
on the economic context. As a general solution, we propose using the always consistently aggregated 
weighted-average Lerner index whenever a composite Lerner index is needed. 
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 















































The Lerner index is a widely used measure of market power in
he economic literature, whose historical and theoretical founda-
ions have been extensively discussed in the literature ( Amoroso,
933; Lerner, 1934; Amoroso, 1938; 1954; Landes and Posner,
981; Elzinga and Mills, 2011; Giocoli, 2012; Shaffer and Spierdijk,
017 ). A firm’s Lerner index compares the market output price
ith the firm’s marginal costs of production, where marginal-cost
ricing is referred to as the “social optimum that is reached in per-
ect competition” ( Lerner, 1934 , p.168). A positive Lerner index is
enerally associated with the presence of market power and re-
uced consumer welfare. 
The Lerner index was originally derived for a firm producing
 single product. The multi-product extension of the Lerner index
omprises separate Lerner indices for each product category. This
ollows from the result that product-specific marginal-cost pricing
lso characterizes the long-run competitive equilibrium of multi-
roduct firms ( Baumol et al., 1982; MacDonald and Slivinski, 1987 ).
Multi-product measures of market power are relevant for the
anking sector, where banks earn a substantial part of their in-
ome from investments and off-balance sheet activities, in addition∗ Corresponding author. 
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ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105859 
378-4266/© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articleo lending. For instance, for U.S. commercial banks with total assets
xceeding $ 100 million, the sum of securities income and realized
apital gains was about 14% of operating income during the 2011–
017 period, on average. For the same group of banks, non-interest
ncome constituted on average about 18% of operating income dur-
ng this period. 1 For an overview of such trends in the European
anking sector, see e.g. Lepetit et al. (2008) . 
Despite the multi-product character of banks, the ‘aggregate’
erner index has nevertheless remained popular in the empirical
anking literature. This Lerner index is based on total assets as the
ingle aggregate output factor. To obtain this Lerner index, banks’
utput price is typically calculated as the average revenue (i.e., to-
al revenue divided by total assets), while the estimate of marginal
osts is based on an aggregate cost function with total assets as
he single output factor. Product-specific Lerner indices – based on
he average revenue per product and a multi-product cost func-
ion – have only been used occasionally in banking. Other studies
ake use of a weighted-average of product-specific Lerner indices
henceforth referred to as ‘the’ weighted-average Lerner index). 
Table 1 provides an overview of recent banking studies using
he Lerner index. These studies, published between 2013–2020, are
rouped into three categories on the basis of the type of Lerner1 Source: authors’ own calculations using Call Report data for the 2011–2017 pe- 
iod; see Appendix A. 
under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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Table 1 
Recent Lerner index studies in banking. 
author(s) output(s) sample period country/region 
Aggregate Lerner index 
Saif-Alyousfi et al. (2020) total assets 1996–2016 6 G.C.C. countries 
Hirata and Ojima (2020) total assets 1996–2016 Japan 
Memanova and Mylonidis (2020) ∗ total earning assets 1997–2010 125 countries 
Wang et al. (2020) total (earning) assets 2006–2015 19 E.U. countries 
Phan et al. (2020) total assets 2004–2014 4 Asian countries 
Shamshur and Weill (2019) total assets 2015 9 E.U. countries 
Biswas (2019) total assets 1978–2004 13 countries 
Deli et al. (2019) ∗ total earning assets 1997–2014 U.S. 
Silva-Buston (2019) total assets 2000 –2007 25 E.U. countries 
Leroy and Lucotte (2019) total assets 1997–2014 16 E.U. countries 
Clark et al. (2018) total assets 2005–2013 CIS countries 
Hryckiewicz and Kozlowski (2018) total assets 1996–2014 54 countries 
Bergbrant et al. (2018) total assets 2000, 2005, 24 Eastern and Central 
2009 E.U. countries 
Spierdijk and Zaouras (2018) total assets 2000–2014 U.S. 
Feng and Wang (2018) total assets 2004–2014 U.S. and Europe 
Cubillas et al. (2017) total assets 1989–2007 104 countries 
Fosu et al. (2017) total assets 1995–2013 U.S. 
Leroy and Lucotte (2017) total assets 2004–2013 97 large European banks 
Shaffer and Spierdijk (2017) total assets 1976–2014 Dewey county, U.S. 
Delis et al. (2016) total earning assets 1997–2009 131 countries 
Carbó-Valverde et al. (2016) total assets 1994–2010 Spain 
Calderon and Schaeck (2016) total assets 1996–2010 124 countries 
Dong et al. (2016) total assets 2002–2013 China 
McMillan and McMillan (2016) total assets 1994–2009 U.S. 
Fernández et al. (2016) total assets 1989–2008 110 countries 
Andrievskaya and Semenova (2016) total assets 1998, 2001, 63–102 countries 
2005, 2010 
Clerides et al. (2015) ∗ total earning assets 1997–2010 148 countries 
Anginer et al. (2014) total assets 1997–2009 63 countries 
Fu et al. (2014) total assets 2003–2010 14 Asia Pacific countries 
Mirzaei and Moore (2014) total assets 1999–2011 146 countries 
Beck et al. (2013) total assets 1994–2009 79 countries 
Hainz et al. (2013) total assets 2000–2005 70 countries 
Weill (2013) total assets 2002–2010 27 E.U. countries 
Product-specific Lerner indices 
Wang et al. (2020) loans, deposits 2006–2015 19 E.U. countries 
Spierdijk and Zaouras (2018) loans, securities 2010–2014 U.S. 
Degl’Innocenti et al. (2017) loans, customer deposits 1993–2011 Italy 
Huang et al. (2017) loans, investments, non-interest income 1998–2010 5 E.U. countries 
Titotto and Ongena (2017) loans, loan advancements to banks, 2000–2014 28 E.U. countries 
securities, other earnings assets, 
derivatives, guarantees (OBS), 
committed credit lines (OBS) 
Forssbæck and Shehzad (2015) loans, deposits 1995–2007 48 countries 
Weighted-average Lerner index 
Tsionas et al. (2018) loans, securities 1984–2007 U.S. 
Ahamed and Mallick (2017) loans, securities 1994–2012 India 
Das and Kumbhakar (2016) loans, investments 1991–1992, India 
2000–2001, 
2009–2010 
Bolt and Humphrey (2015) consumer loans, business loans and securities 2008–2010 U.S. 
Hakenes et al. (2015) loans, securities and OBS items 1995–2004 Germany 
Inklaar et al. (2015) interbank loans, commercial loans, 1996–2006 Germany 
securities, OBS items 
Kick and Prieto (2015) consumer loans, business loans and securities 1994–2010 Germany 
Restrepo-Tobón and Kumbhakar (2014) loans, securities 1976–2007 U.S. 
Buch et al. (2013) interbank loans, customer loans, 2003–2006 Germany 
securities, OBS items 
Notes: This non-exhaustive table lists some recent studies (published since 2013) using aggregate, product-specific and weighted-average Lerner 
indices. Studies that appear more than once employ different Lerner indices. The abbreviation OBS stands for ‘off-balance sheet’. All studies 
listed use the translog cost function to estimate the marginal-cost component of the Lerner index, apart from the ones marked with a star. 














o  index used: the aggregate Lerner index (upper panel), product-
specific Lerner indices (middle panel) and the weighted-average of
the product-specific Lerner indices (lower panel). 
In the economic literature about ‘consistent aggregation’, func-
tions depending on various disaggregate variables are transformed
into functions that depend on a single aggregate variable, or se-
ries of disaggregate functions are transformed into a single aggre-ate function (e.g., Gorman, 1959; Berndt and Christensen, 1974;
hipman, 1974; Vartia, 1976; Brown et al., 1979; Blackorby and
chworm, 1988; Kim, 1986; Blackorby and Primont, 1980; Black-
rby and Russell, 1999 ). Examples are the aggregation of a firm’s
ulti-product cost function (depending on multiple outputs) into
 single-product cost function (depending on a single aggregate
utput) and the aggregation of multiple firms’ efficiency indices


































































































































a  nto a single industry-level aggregate efficiency index. In these and
ther cases, the aggregation must be done ‘consistently’ to ensure
hat the aggregated form shares the particular economic and math-
matical properties associated with the underlying disaggregated
orms. 
To our best knowledge, the literature has only considered the
onsistent aggregation of firm-specific measures of market power
nto industry-wide measures (e.g., Schroeter and Azzam, 1990;
orrison Paul, 1999; Neven and Röller, 1999 ). In particular, the
onsistent aggregation of product-specific Lerner indices has not
et been addressed. According to the aforementioned literature,
owever, consistent aggregation is a necessary property for the ag-
regate Lerner index to represent a summary measure of a multi-
roduct bank’s market power in different output markets. The con-
inued use in the banking literature of a potentially inconsistently
ggregated Lerner index is a key motivation for our study. 
Our theoretical contribution to the literature is twofold. First,
e define the concept of a consistently aggregated Lerner index
n line with the aforementioned consistent-aggregation literature.
econd, we derive three conditions under which the aggregate
erner index is consistently aggregated. If these consistency con-
itions hold, this Lerner index reduces to the weighted-average
erner index. If any of these conditions is rejected, however, the
ggregate Lerner index is no longer consistently aggregated. This
art of our study also provides the missing link among the three
ifferent types of Lerner indices used in the literature and included
n Table 1 . 
Although one of the aforementioned conditions has been de-
cribed as “extremely restrictive” in the literature ( Brown et al.,
979 ), whether the three conditions hold for a given sample is ul-
imately an empirical matter. We therefore provide an empirical
pplication in addition to our theoretical analysis. Our contribu-
ion is that we provide an empirical strategy to test the consistency
onditions, applied to a sample of U.S. commercial banks observed
uring the 2011–2017 period. Here we distinguish among three
ines of business of multi-product banks: lending, investments and
ff-balance-sheet activities. We find that all three conditions are
tatistically rejected, which means that the aggregate Lerner index
s not consistently aggregated for our sample of banks. We show
hat the statistically rejected conditions may cause economically
elevant distortions to the aggregate Lerner index, depending on
he economic context. 
Our analysis raises the question why the aggregate index should
e used in the first place. The user of this index should at least test
hether it is consistently aggregated for the particular sample at
and. This already turns out to require the calculation of the com-
onents of the weighted-average Lerner index. Furthermore, will
how that some cost functions (such as the well-known translog)
re never separable in total output. Based on such a cost function,
he aggregate Lerner index is a priori known to be inconsistently
ggregated. Such a cost function is therefore not suitable for the
urpose of estimating the aggregate Lerner index, although it could
till provide a good fit to the data. 
As an efficient solution to these issues, we propose using the
eighted-average Lerner index whenever a composite Lerner index
s needed. Because the weighted-average Lerner index is always
onsistently aggregated regardless of the underlying cost function,
his index can simply be based on a cost function that fits the data
ell without further concerns about this cost function’s separabil-
ty properties. 
The setup of the remainder of this study is as follows. We start
ith a literature review in Section 2 . Section 3 contains the the-
retical framework and derives the conditions under which the
ggregate Lerner index is consistently aggregated. The setup of
ur empirical analysis is outlined in Section 4 , while the em-
irical results are presented and discussed in Section 5 . Lastly,ection 6 concludes. An online appendix with supplementary ma-
erial is available. 
. Literature review 
From an economic perspective, market power results in higher
rices and lower quantities, which reduces consumer and total
elfare relative to what can be attained in a hypothetical per-
ectly competitive outcome. This is the main reason why policy-
akers care about market power and generally seek to suppress
t. Banks’ central role in the provision of credit, the payment sys-
em, the transmission of monetary policy and in maintaining finan-
ial stability leads to particularly large concerns about their market
ower. 
Driven by these concerns, both the theoretical and the empiri-
al literature have investigated the impact of banking competition
n various economic outcomes, including financial stability, bank
fficiency, information sharing and economic growth (e.g., Degryse
t al., 2018; Coccorese, 2017 ). The theoretical literature has offered
ixed predictions about the effects of banking competition on eco-
omic outcomes. For example, the ‘competition-stability’ view pre-
icts a positive impact of banking competition on financial sta-
ility, while the ‘competition-fragility’ view conjectures the oppo-
ite. A similar ambiguity applies to the competition-growth rela-
ion, for which partial equilibrium models tend to predict a neg-
tive relation and general equilibrium models a positive one. Also
he competition-efficiency relation is subject to such diverging the-
retical results: a positive relation is predicted by the ‘efficient-
tructure’ hypothesis, while the ‘quiet-life hypothesis’ conjectures a
egative relation. The last controversy that we mention is the rela-
ion between banking competition and relationship lending. While
ome studies predict that banks operating in a highly competi-
ive environment could be inhibited from forming long-term lend-
ng relationships with small and medium-sized enterprises, oth-
rs conjecture that banking competition boosts relationship lend-
ng (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Boot and Thakor, 20 0 0 ). 
Because of the widespread ambiguity in the theoretical litera-
ure, the impact of banking competition is ultimately an empirical
atter. Consequently, there exists an abundant empirical literature
hat analyzes the effect of banking competition on economic out-
omes. We refer to Degryse et al. (2018) and Coccorese (2017) for a
ecent overview of this literature and a discussion of the reported
ffects of banking competition on economic outcomes. 
The aforementioned empirical banking studies rely on certain
easures of market power. Popular measures besides the Lerner
ndex include market shares (such as the four-bank concentra-
ion ratio and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index), the Rothschild-
resnahan conduct index (also known as the conduct parameter),
he Panzar-Rosse H -statistic and the Hay-Liu-Boone index (also
nown as the performance-structure-conduct indicator); see e.g.
haffer and Spierdijk (2017) and Degryse et al. (2018) . Although
ll of these measures may fail to correctly indicate the absence or
resence of market power in specific cases, concentration indices
re widely considered to fall short as a reliable measure of mar-
et power in general. Also the Panzar-Rosse H -statistic has been
hown to be unfit as a measure of market power and has been rel-
gated to the same category as the concentration measures ( Hyde
nd Perloff, 1995; Bikker et al., 2012; Shaffer and Spierdijk, 2015 ). 
Blair and Sokol (2014 , p. 325) report that the Lerner index
as become “the standard measure of market power (...) among
conomists”, while Shaffer and Spierdijk (2017) call it a measure
hat is among the “scant handful of ‘least objectionable’ methods”.
he value of the Lerner index is monotonically associated with
onsumer welfare losses from market power for given costs and
emand functions. It has also been shown to represent the slope of
 social welfare function ( Dansby and Willig, 1979 ). Like any mea-



































































































2 As shown in Shaffer (1983) , the average revenue can reflect any two-part tariffs 
or nonlinear pricing schedules. Average revenue also has the advantage of reflecting 
actual transaction prices even when they deviate from posted prices (due to errors, 
idiosyncratic negotiations with selected counterparties, etc.). 
3 Because these studies typically write the weighted-average Lerner index in a 
different way, their index is not directly recognizable as a share-weighted average. 
Using short-hand notation that leaves out the functions’ arguments for the sake of 
readability, these studies write L WA = ( ̄R A − AC 
∑ n 
k =1 e k ) / ̄R A , where AC denotes aver- 
age costs and e k the elasticity of the multi-product cost function c with respect to 
the k th output. sure of market power, also the Lerner index has certain concep-
tual limitations, related to issues such as inefficiency, economies
of scale and a lack of profit maximizing behavior (e.g., Scitovsky,
1955; Cairns, 1995; Koetter et al., 2012; Spierdijk and Zaouras,
2017; 2018 ). For a more detailed discussion and comparison of the
properties of the popular measures of banking competition, we re-
fer to Shaffer and Spierdijk (2017) and Degryse et al. (2018) . 
The initial versions of the aforementioned measures of market
power have in common that they assume that a bank (or other
firm) produces a single output factor. For some of these measures,
extensions to the multi-output case have been proposed (e.g.,
Gelfand and Spiller, 1987; Suominen, 1994; Feenstra and Levin-
sohn, 1995; Shaffer, 1996; Barbosa et al., 2015 ). For the Lerner in-
dex, originally derived by Lerner (1934) for a firm producing a sin-
gle product, the multi-product extension is fairly straightforward
and relies on the result that product-specific marginal-cost pricing
also characterizes the long-run competitive equilibrium of multi-
product firms ( Baumol et al., 1982; MacDonald and Slivinski, 1987 ).
Baumol et al. (1982) and MacDonald and Slivinski (1987) show this
for markets with multi-product firms only and for markets with
both single- and multi-product firms, respectively. Their proofs
make use of the concept of a perfectly contestable market (PCM).
They show that, for both single- and multi-product firms in a PCM
market, the first-order conditions imply marginal-cost pricing. This
argument then carries over to competitive equilibrium, which is a
specific form of a PCM. 
From the upper panel of Table 1 it becomes apparent that
the aggregate Lerner index has remained popular in the empiri-
cal banking literature despite banks’ multi-product character. Com-
monly used data sources such as BankScope and the U.S. Call Re-
ports provide sufficiently detailed data to obtain product-specific
Lerner indices. The popularity of the aggregate Lerner index there-
fore seems largely driven by the convenience of using a single-
output measure of market power (for instance, as an explanatory
variable in a regression analysis). 
The economic literature has paid only limited attention to
the consistent aggregation of measures of market power. For
example, the banking studies listed in the lower panel of
Table 1 use a weighted-average of product-specific Lerner in-
dices without addressing the topic of consistent aggregation.
Gischer et al. (2015) criticize the way the aggregate Lerner index’
average revenue is calculated, but do not refer to consistent aggre-
gation. A few studies consider the consistent aggregation of firm-
specific measures of market power into industry-wide measures
(e.g., Schroeter and Azzam, 1990; Morrison Paul, 1999; Neven and
Röller, 1999 ), while others aggregate Lerner indices over firms or
outputs by means of share weighting without reference to con-
sistent aggregation (e.g., Spiller and Favaro, 1984; Encaoua et al.,
1986; Verboven, 1996; Chirinko and Fazzari, 20 0 0 ). As explained
in the introduction, it remains to be seen if the aggregate Lerner
index is a consistently aggregated measure of market power. 
3. The Lerner index and consistent aggregation 
This section will show that the aggregate Lerner index is con-
sistently aggregated only under three conditions. All proofs for this
section can be found in Appendix B. 
3.1. Definitions 
Product-specific and weighted-average Lerner indices We assume
a multi-product total cost function c ( y, w ), where y = (y 1 , . . . , y n )
and w = (w 1 , . . . , w K ) . Here y j ≥ 0 denotes the level of the j th
output and w k ≥ 0 the value of the k th exogenous input price,
for j = 1 , . . . , n and k = 1 , . . . , K. The marginal costs with respecto each output are denoted MC j (y , w ) = ∂ c(y , w ) /∂ y j > 0 . The ob-
erved market output price of the j th output is written as P j ( y ),
ith P j ( y ) > 0 for y j > 0. Although this price will usually also de-
end on variables other than y , we suppress this for simplicity of
otation. 
The Lerner index for the j th output is defined for y j > 0 and
aptures the relative markup of the market output price over
arginal costs. Specifically, the product-specific Lerner indices in
he banking literature use the average revenue earned on each out-
ut factor, denoted R̄ j (y ) = R j (y ) /y j , as the market output price. 2 
his yields 
 j (y , w ) = 
R̄ j (y ) − MC j (y , w ) 
R̄ j ( y ) 
. (1)
he studies in the second panel of Table 1 estimate product-
pecific Lerner indices and typically use loans, securities and off-
alance sheet items as the output factors. 
The weighted-average Lerner index based on n ≥ 2 product-
pecific Lerner indices is defined as 
 WA (y , w ) = 
n ∑ 
j=1 
ω j (y ) L j (y , w ) , (2)
ith revenue shares as the weights, as suggested by
ncaoua et al. (1986) : 
 j (y ) = 
R j (y ) 
R A (y ) 
, R A (y ) = 
n ∑ 
j=1 
R j (y ) . (3)
y rewriting (2) using short-hand notation that leaves out the
unctions’ arguments for the sake of readability, we find 
 WA = 
n ∑ 
j=1 















R j /y j − MC j 




j=1 R j −
∑ n 
j=1 y j MC j 
R A 
= R A −
∑ n 
j=1 ω j MC j 
R A 
. (4)
ere ω̄ j = y j / 
∑ n 
j=1 y j denotes the output share of the i th output
nd R̄ A = R A / 
∑ n 
j=1 y j the average revenue on total output. From
4) , we see that L WA is defined for values of y with 
∑ n 
j=1 y j > 0
which we will henceforth denote by y  = 0 ) and that it can be
iewed as a single-output Lerner index with R̄ A as the market out-
ut price and weighted-average marginal costs as the marginal
osts. The weighted-average Lerner index has recently been used
n various banking studies; see the lower panel of Table 1 . 3 
Aggregate Lerner index The starting point of the aggregate Lerner
ndex is the existence of an aggregate output factor y , with cor-
esponding market output price P A ( y ) > 0 for y > 0, cost func-
ion c A ( y , w ) and associated marginal cost function MC A (y, w ) =
 c A (y, w ) /∂y > 0 . Specifically, the aggregate Lerner index uses to-
al output 
∑ n 
j=1 y j as the aggregate output factor and the average
evenue earned on total output ( ̄R A ) as the market price of total
utput. The index is defined for y  = 0 and writes as 
 A (y , w ) = 
R̄ A (y ) − MC A ( 
∑ n 
j=1 y j , w ) 
R̄ ( y ) 
. (5)























































































































d  he empirical banking studies listed in the upper panel of
able 1 have recently used the aggregate Lerner index. 
Consistent aggregation Using the same notation as before, we
ontinue to consider a K -input and n -output bank with input-
rice vector w , output vector y , multi-product cost function c ( y,
 ) and market output prices P j ( y ) for j = 1 , . . . , n . In this set-
ing, we consider the product-specific Lerner indices L j ( y, w ) and
ome Lerner index L (y , w ) : D × R K + → R (with D ⊂ R n + ) of which we
ould like to know whether it is consistently aggregated. We will
rite L = (L 1 , . . . , L n ) and P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) to denote vectors of val-
es of product-specific Lerner indices and output prices, respec-
ively, where L ∈ R n and P ∈ R n + . Furthermore, we will henceforth
ssume that y ∈ D and w ∈ R K + , even if we do not explicitly men-
ion this. 
To define a consistently aggregated Lerner index in line with
he literature, we proceed in a way comparable to Blackorby and
ussell (1999) . From them, we take the requirements of aggrega-
ion, monotonicity and (non-)competitive indication, resulting in
he following definition: 
efinition 3.1. A Lerner index L ( y, w ) is consistently aggregated
f there exists a differentiable function F : R n × R n + × R n + → R that
atisfies the requirements of aggregation, monotonicity, and (non-
competitive indication: 
(i) [Aggregation] L (y , w ) = F (L 1 (y , w ) , . . . , L n (y , w ) , P 1 (y ) ,
. . . , P n (y ) , y ) for all y, w . 
(ii) [Monotonicity] ∂F ( L, P, y )/ ∂L j > 0 for all L, P, y . 
(iii) [(Non-)competitive indication] F (0 , . . . , 0 , P , y ) = 0 and
F (1 , . . . , 1 , P , y ) = 1 for all P, y . 
Under the aggregation requirement, L is a function of the
roduct-specific Lerner indices, ensuring an economic interpreta-
ion as a summary measure of a bank’s product-specific Lerner in-
ices. The monotonicity requirement ensures that L increases fol-
owing a ceteris paribus increase in one of the product-specific
erner indices. The requirement of (non-)competitive indication
s imposed to ensure that L shares the particular economic and
athematical properties associated with the underlying product-
pecific Lerner indices. The first part of requirement (iii) ensures
hat L is 0 if each L j is 0, which implies that both L and each L j 
ave 0 as the competitive benchmark value. To see this, we re-
all from the literature review that product-specific marginal cost
ricing characterizes long-run competitive equilibrium in markets
ith only multi-product firms, as well as markets with both single-
nd multi-product firms ( Baumol and Bradford, 1970; MacDonald
nd Slivinski, 1987 ). The second part of requirement (iii) ensures
hat L is 1 if each L j is 1. Hence, if all product-specific marginal
osts are zero, then the aggregate index must have the value that
orresponds to zero marginal costs at the aggregate level. In Ap-
endix B it is shown that two other natural properties with respect
o (non-)competitive indication are automatically satisfied under
efinition 3.1 . 
To see that the class of consistently aggregated Lerner indices is
ot empty, consider share-weighted Lerner indices of the form 
 SW (y , w ) = 
n ∑ 
j=1 
s j L j (y , w ) , 0 < s j < 1 , 
n ∑ 
j=1 
s j = 1 . (6)
ere the shares s j are allowed to be functions of the form s j =
 j (P 1 (y ) , . . . , P 1 (y ) , y ) . Evidently, this class of Lerner indices satis-
es the requirements of Definition 3.1 and is thereby consistently
ggregated. This also holds for the weighted-average Lerner index
s defined in Section 3.1 . A further characterization of the class of
onsistently aggregated Lerner indices is provided in Appendix B. 
We need some theory before we can conclude whether or not
he popular aggregated Lerner index is consistently aggregated. Separability in total output Several studies about consistent ag-
regation of functions show that this concept is in some way re-
ated to ‘separability’ of the underlying functions (e.g., Berndt and
hristensen, 1974 ). Such a relation also turns out to exist in case of
he aggregate Lerner index, where the function of relevance is the
ulti-product cost function. We provide a definition of the type of
eparability that is relevant in our case. 
Brown et al. (1979) define a separable multi-product cost func-
ion as a cost function c ( y, w ) for which a single-output cost
unction c A ( y , w ) and an output aggregation function h ( y ) exist
uch that c(y , w ) = c A (h (y ) , w ) for all y, w . The output aggregation
unction aggregates the vector of outputs y into a scalar measure of
ggregate output h ( y ). Stated differently, a separable multi-product
ost function is equal to a single-output cost function with aggre-
ate output h ( y ) as the single output factor ( Kim, 1986 ). 
efinition 3.2. A multi-product cost function c ( y, w ) is separable
n total output if there exists a single-output cost function c A ( y , w )
uch that c(y , w ) = c A ( 
∑ n 
j=1 y j , w ) for all y, w . 
Hence, a multi-product cost function that is separable in total
utput reduces to a single-output cost function with total output
 n 
j=1 y j as the aggregate output factor. 
.2. Consistency conditions 
Aggregate Lerner index In line with the literature about consis-
ent aggregation, we find a strong relation between separability in
otal output of the multi-product cost function and consistent ag-
regation of the aggregate Lerner index. 
esult 3.1. Assume that banks’ multi-product cost function is
iven by c ( y, w ), with corresponding L WA ( y, w ) as defined in (4) .
et h (y ) = ∑ n j=1 y j . If there exists a single-output cost function
 A ( y , w ) such that c(y , w ) = c A (h (y ) , w ) for all y, w , then L A in
5) based on c A is consistently aggregated and L A = L WA . Con-
ersely, if c is not separable in h ( y ), then L A based on any single-
utput cost function c A is not consistently aggregated and L A  =
 WA . 
The implications of this result are as follows. If banks’ multi-
roduct cost function is separable in total output, then the aggre-
ate Lerner index L A is consistently aggregated and equal to the
eighted-average Lerner index L WA . If banks’ multi-product cost
unction is not separable in total output, it is either separable
n a different aggregate output measure or not separable at all.
esult 3.1 tells us that, in either case, the aggregate Lerner index
ased on any single-output cost function we may come up with is
ot consistently aggregated and not equal to the weighted-average
erner index. 
The practical consequence of Result 3.1 is that we first have to
erify whether banks’ multi-product cost function is separable in
otal output before we can use the aggregate Lerner index in an
mpirical setting. We note that it does not seem very likely that
eparability in total output will often exist in practice. Brown et al.
1979 , p. 257) call the implications of separability in an aggre-
ate output factor “extremely restrictive”. If separability in some ag-
regate output factor is already considered extremely restrictive,
hen separability in a specific aggregate output factor (namely to-
al output) will be even more restrictive. The restrictiveness of
eparability in total output stems from the implied property that
he marginal costs are the same for all outputs. This property fol-
ows immediately from the multi-product cost function’s functional
orm under separability in total output as given in Definition 3.2 . 
Empirical aggregate Lerner index The studies referred to in the
pper panel of Table 1 make use of the ‘empirical’ aggregate Lerner
ndex L e 
A 
, which differs from the ‘theoretical’ aggregate Lerner in-
ex L A as defined in (5) . L 
e 
A 
is based on a different aggregate output

















































Lerner indices and consistency conditions. 
composite index conditions for consistent aggregation 
L A [SEP] 
L WA always consistently aggregated 
L e 
A 




Notes: This table lists the condition(s) that must hold for 
each index to qualify as a consistently aggregated Lerner 
index. Here L A is defined in (5) , L WA in (4) , L 
e 
A 
in (8) , and 
L e 
WA 













































p  factor, namely total assets instead of total output. It also makes use
of a different revenue, namely the sum of interest and non-interest
(INI) income instead of the sum of the product-specific revenues.




We start with the following observation. Depending on the cho-
sen banking model, there may be a non-equivalence between to-
tal assets and total output and between INI income and the to-
tal revenue. Some components of total assets may not be consid-
ered an output, while other components are viewed as an out-
put but are not part of total assets. For example, total assets in-
clude fixed assets, which are considered an input instead of an
output in the commonly used intermediation model of banking
( Klein, 1971; Monti, 1972; Sealey and Lindley, 1977 ). Furthermore,
off-balance sheet activities are not included in total assets, while
they are often considered to be an output factor (e.g., DeYoung
and Rice, 2004; Wheelock and Wilson, 2012 ). These two sources
of non-equivalence work in opposite directions regarding the mis-
match between total assets and total output, so total assets could
potentially either overstate or understate total output for individ-
ual banks in the intermediation model. 
Also the direction of the non-equivalence between INI income
and the total revenue is ambiguous. For instance, service fees on
deposits are part of INI income, but are not part of the total rev-
enue according to the intermediation model of banking (where de-
posits are considered an input instead of an output). Furthermore,
capital gains on the output factor securities are not part of INI in-
come; they are listed as a separate item on banks’ income state-
ment. Yet securities are included in total assets and part of their
revenue stems from these capital gains. 
We can thus write total assets as the sum of certain non-output
variables and some of the output factors. Similarly, INI income is
written as the sum of the income on certain non-output variables
and the revenue on some of the output factors. Stated differently,
there are included non-output variables and excluded output fac-
tors. Informally, we thus write 
total assets = total output − excluded outputs 
+ included non-outputs ;
INI income = total revenue − revenue on excluded outpu
+ income on included non-outputs , 
where we note that the excluded outputs and included non-
outputs may differ between total assets and INI income. 
We will now formalize the above considerations, while allowing
for any banking model and not just the intermediation model as
considered above. We assume that there are additional variables
˜ y1 , . . . , ̃  ym , which are considered non-output variables according to
the chosen banking model. In case of the intermediation model of
banking, the variables ˜ y1 , . . . , ̃  ym include fixed assets and deposits.
With z = ( ̃  y1 , . . . , ̃  ym , y 1 , . . . , y n ) , we can now write total assets and
INI income as, respectively, 
k (z ) = h (y ) −
∑ 
j∈ J 
y j + 
∑ 
k ∈ K 
˜ yk , Q A (z ) = R A (y ) −
∑ 
 ∈ L 
R  (y ) + 
∑ 
p∈ P 
Q p (z ) , 
(7)
for income functions Q p . 
Writing z  = 0 for values of z with k ( z ) > 0, we define Q̄ A (z ) =
Q A (z ) /k (z ) for z  = 0 . We can then write the empirical aggregate
Lerner index as 
L e A (z , w ) = 
Q̄ A (z ) − MC A (k (z ) , w ) 
Q̄ A (z ) 
. (8)
In Appendix B, we prove that L e 
A 
is not consistently aggregated
if k (z )  = h (y ) or Q (z )  = R (y ) for some y , z  = 0 . By contrast, ifA A  (z ) = h (y ) and Q A (z ) = R A (y ) for all y, z (“no excluded outputs
nd no included non-outputs”), we can use Result 3.1 to determine
hether L e 
A 
is consistently aggregated. This leads to the following
esult: 
esult 3.2. Assume that banks’ multi-product cost function is
iven by c ( y, w ). Consider L e 
A 
as defined in (8) , based on some
ingle-output cost function c A . If k (z )  = h (y ) or Q A (z )  = R A (y ) for
ome y , z  = 0 , then L e 
A 
is not consistently aggregated. Conversely, if
 (z ) = h (y ) and Q A (z ) = R A (y ) for all y, z , then L e A (z , w ) = L A (y , w )
or all w and y , z  = 0 and Result 3.1 applies. 
Result 3.2 leads to the following three necessary and sufficient
onditions for L e 
A 
to be consistently aggregated: separability in to-
al output of the multi-product cost function ( [SEP] ), equivalence
f total output and total assets ( [EQ1] ) and equivalence of total
evenue and INI income ( [EQ2] ). The intuition behind these consis-
ency conditions is as follows. The first consistency condition en-
ures that the single-output aggregate cost function used for L e 
A 
co-
ncides with the underlying multi-product cost function. The sec-
nd and third conditions ensure that the aggregate output factor




are both consistent with the choice of outputs in the underlying
ulti-product cost function. If any of these conditions do not hold,
hen L e 
A 
will not be consistently aggregated. 
Empirical weighted-average Lerner index The studies referred to
n the lower panel of Table 1 make use of the ‘empirical’ weighted-
verage Lerner index L e 
WA 
. In contrast to the ‘theoretical’ weighted-
verage Lerner index L WA as defined in (4) , it uses INI income in-
tead of the sum of the product-specific revenues R A . Using the
ame notation as for L e 
A 
, we can thus write 
 
e 
WA (z , w ) = 
˜ Q A (z ) −
∑ n 
j=1 ω̄ j (y ) MC j (y , w ) 
˜ Q A (z ) 
, (9)
ith ˜ Q A (z ) = Q A (z ) /h (y ) . Following the same line of reasoning as
or L e 
A 
, we can show that L e 
WA 
is consistently aggregated if and only
f Q A (z ) = R A (y ) for all y, z . This result has been relegated to Ap-
endix B. 
The upper panel of Table 2 summarizes the conditions under
hich each of the indices L A , L 
e 
A 




ated. The statistical testing of these conditions will play a major
ole in the empirical part of our analysis. 
. Empirical setup 
This section describes the data sample, banking model and
ulti-product cost function that will be used in our empirical ap-
lication. 
.1. Data and banking model 
We use year-end Call Report Data to create an unbalanced sam-
le of U.S. commercial banks covering the 2011–2017 period. We



















































































































estrict the sample to commercial banks that are part of a bank-
olding company, with a physical location in a U.S. state and sub-
ect to deposit-related insurance. 
The common procedure in the banking literature is to choose a
articular banking model in order to define the output and input
actors. Subsequently, a specific functional form of the total cost
unction is chosen. We follow that procedure and base our choice
f inputs and outputs on the widely used intermediation model
or banking ( Klein, 1971; Monti, 1972 ). More specifically, we as-
ume that banks employ a technology with four inputs and three
utput factors ( Wheelock and Wilson, 2012 ). The four inputs that
e consider are purchased funds, core deposits, labor services, and
hysical capital. The corresponding input prices are (i) the price of
urchased funds of bank i = 1 , . . . , N in year t = 1 , . . . , T (denoted
 1, it ), (ii) the core deposit interest rate ( w 2, it ), (iii) the wage rate
 w 3, it ), and (iv) the price of physical capital ( w 4, it ). Total operating
osts ( c it ) are defined as the sum of expenses on purchased funds,
ore deposits, personnel, and physical capital. 
The three output factors that we consider are total loans and
eases ( y 1, it ), total securities ( y 2, it ) and off-balance sheet activities
 y 3, it ). For total loans and leases, we use interest and lease in-
ome as the revenue. For total securities (defined as the sum of
old-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities), we use interest
nd dividend income (also known as securities income) and real-
zed capital gains on securities as the revenue. We define the rev-
nue from off-balance sheet activities as non-interest income mi-
us service fees on deposits (e.g., DeYoung and Rice, 2004; Boyd
nd Gertler, 1994 ). Due to a lack of direct output data, the output
ssociated with the off-balance sheet revenue has to be obtained
ndirectly. We convert the adjusted non-interest income to non-
nterest income capitalization credit equivalents using the method
f Boyd and Gertler (1994) . This method measures off-balance
heet activities in units of on-balance sheet assets that would be
equired to generate the observed level of adjusted non-interest in-
ome. The resulting quantity serves as our output measure of off-
alance sheet activities. The Boyd-Gertler method assumes that on-
nd off-balance sheet items are equally profitable at the margin.
lark and Siems (2002) argue that this assumption is reasonable
n fairly competitive markets. 4 In such markets, a reallocation of
utputs would take place in case of unequal profit margins across
ifferent outputs. 
The banking literature has emphasized the relevance of bank-
pecific cost technologies (e.g., Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Kumb-
akar and Tsionas, 2008 ). We therefore use banks’ total output
n prices of the year 2017 to stratify our sample and distinguish
mong four size classes: (i) less than $ 100 million, (ii) $ 10 0–50 0
illion, (iii) $ 500 million–1 billion, and (iv) more than $ 1 billion.
he next section will present empirical results for each size class. 
Having defined the required variables and the size classes, we
lter out inconsistent values in the data and use trimming to re-
ove outliers. The exact filtering rules are listed in Appendix A.
his appendix also explains how the Call Report series have been
sed to construct the variables required for our analysis. 
Table 3 provides (non-deflated) sample statistics on these vari-
bles, including output and revenue shares, output quantities, aver-
ge revenue, and number of banks and bank-year observations. We
ighlight a few figures. On average, total loans have larger revenue
nd output shares than total securities and off-balance sheet activ-
ties, regardless of bank size. Banks in the two largest size classes
ave relatively low average revenue and output shares for loans
nd securities, but higher average shares for off-balance sheet ac-4 One could even argue that this assumption will hold in any profit-maximizing 
quilibrium. That is, if it did not hold, an allocation with more of the most prof- 
table and less of the least profitable of the two outputs would yield a higher profit, 
hich contradicts the assumption of profit maximization. ivities. Regardless of the size class, loans have the highest aver-
ge revenue, followed by off-balance sheet activities and securities.
anks in the two largest size classes have relatively large average
hares of adjusted non-interest income and fiduciary services and
hey also have a higher average wage rate. The dispersion in out-
ut levels is relatively large for banks in the largest size class. 
.2. Cost functions 
Multi-product cost functions have a long history in banking
e.g., Benston et al., 1982; Shaffer, 1984 ). It is well-known that
he popular translog cost function – introduced by Christensen
t al. (1971, 1973) – requires a relatively homogeneous sample in
erms of bank size and product mix to provide an accurate fit (e.g.,
cAllister and McManus, 1993; Feng and Serletis, 2010; Wheelock
nd Wilson, 2012 ). In a multi-product setting, the problem of size
eterogeneity is amplified due to the presence of multiple outputs.
ven if the translog cost function is estimated separately for rel-
tively homogeneous samples of banks in terms of total output,
here can still be substantial variation across banks in terms of one
r more individual outputs. This is because the various outputs are
ot perfectly correlated. For instance, there are banks that are large
n terms of loans, but small in terms of securities. 
Although non-parametric methods have proven their usefulness
n the modeling of cost functions in banking (e.g., Wheelock and
ilson, 2012; 2018 ), we confine our analysis to parametric cost
unctions. The main reason for this choice is that our research
uestion requires us to assess whether the cost function is sepa-
able in total output. 
In the light of the aforementioned problems associated with the
ranslog cost function, we consider another parametric cost func-
ion in addition to the translog: the generalized Leontief cost func-
ion ( Diewert, 1971; Fuss, 1977 ). Generalized Leontief technolo-
ies have been widely used in banking and other fields, both in
 single- and a multi-product context (e.g., Thomsen, 20 0 0; Gun-
ing and Sickles, 2011; Martín-Oliver et al., 2013; Miller et al.,
013 ). Multi-product Leontief cost functions already date back to
all (1973) . Some basic properties of the translog and general-
zed Leontief cost functions are discussed in Appendix C, where
t is shown that both cost functions differ in terms of the possible
hapes of the average and marginal cost functions. 
.2.1. Empirical specification: translog 
We consider a translog cost function similar to
oetter et al. (2012) and many others. As usual, we impose
inear homogeneity in input prices by normalizing total costs and
nput prices with the price of purchased funds w 1, it . This normal-
zation will be reflected in our notation by the use of variables
ith a tilde, indicating that they have been normalized with the
rice of purchased funds prior to taking the logarithmic transfor-
ation. This results in the following four-input and three-output
ranslog cost function for bank i in year t : 
og ( ̃  c it ) = αi + 
4 ∑ 
j=2 
β j,w log ( ̃  w j,it ) + (1 / 2) 
4 ∑ 
j=2 






k ≥ j 










β,y log (y ,it ) + (1 / 2) 
3 ∑ 
 =1 
β,yy [ log (y ,it ) ] 
2 
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Table 3 
Sample statistics for U.S. commercial bank data (2011–2017). 
ALL CLASS 1 CLASS 2 CLASS 3 CLASS 4 
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. 
total loans ( TLNS ) 1,325,996 20,796,483 35,785 17,721 141,414 74,711 410,014 136,794 9,432,481 57,647,651 
total securities ( TSEC ) 465,813 8,532,902 14,960 11,991 51,502 41,431 129,769 89,008 3,313,952 23,724,496 
off-balance sheet items (OBS, 
Boyd-Gertler) 
1,263,169 32,892,009 5,337 5,786 31,486 33,288 123,233 96,137 9,682,341 91,763,741 
off-balance sheet items (ANII, adjusted 
non-interest income) 
28,940 659,572 170 181 990 1,014 3,771 2,883 219,849 1,837,628 
total assets ( TA ) 2,340,214 43,338,155 62,531 24,578 222,826 99,989 613,052 155,562 16,849,638 120,490,743 
total costs ( C ) 47,032 826,296 1,505 673 5,349 2,608 14,896 4,669 332,469 2,296,058 
equity ratio ( EQ / TA ) 10.8% 2.7% 11.1% 3.2% 10.7% 2.6% 10.5% 2.3% 10.9% 2.6% 
revenue share total loans ( ω 1 ) 75.5% 14.0% 78.1% 14.1% 76.1% 13.1% 73.9% 13.6% 69.5% 14.9% 
revenue share total securities ( ω 2 ) 13.8% 11.8% 15.4% 13.6% 14.0% 11.7% 12.0% 9.9% 11.5% 8.5% 
revenue share off-balance sheet items 
( ω 3 ) 
10.7% 10.0% 6.5% 6.1% 9.9% 8.3% 14.2% 11.2% 19.0% 14.7% 
output share total loans ( ˜ ω1 ) 62.7% 17.0% 64.2% 18.1% 63.3% 16.5% 61.9% 16.3% 57.6% 16.6% 
output share total securities ( ˜ ω2 ) 23.2% 15.6% 26.6% 17.8% 23.5% 15.3% 19.7% 13.0% 17.8% 10.9% 
output share off-balance sheet items 
( ˜ ω3 ) 
14.2% 12.4% 9.2% 8.4% 13.2% 10.5% 18.5% 13.6% 24.6% 17.3% 
average revenue total loans 5.4% 1.0% 5.8% 1.0% 5.4% 0.8% 5.1% 0.9% 4.8% 1.1% 
average revenue total securities 2.4% 1.3% 2.5% 1.7% 2.4% 1.1% 2.5% 1.2% 2.4% 1.0% 
average revenue off-balance sheet 
items 
3.2% 0.6% 3.3% 0.7% 3.2% 0.6% 3.2% 0.7% 3.0% 0.7% 
average revenue total assets 4.7% 1.4% 4.4% 1.0% 4.7% 1.1% 4.9% 1.5% 5.1% 2.5% 
price of purchased funds ( w 1 ) 1.2% 0.8% 1.1% 1.0% 1.2% 0.7% 1.3% 0.7% 1.4% 1.0% 
price or core deposits ( w 2 ) 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 
wage rate ( w 3 ) 68.1 18.0 62.3 15.5 67.1 16.3 72.9 18.9 79.7 21.7 
price of physical capital ( w 4 ) 34.5% 43.0% 44.8% 51.4% 30.1% 39.5% 30.5% 38.5% 33.6% 37.1% 
adjusted non-interest 
income/operating income 
16.9% 10.7% 13.0% 7.2% 16.1% 9.0% 20.3% 11.9% 25.6% 15.0% 
deposit service fee/operating income 5.2% 4.1% 5.6% 3.9% 5.1% 3.7% 4.9% 4.5% 5.2% 5.2% 
fiduciary services/operating income 0.8% 3.1% 0.1% 1.0% 0.6% 2.6% 1.7% 4.5% 2.4% 4.7% 
total output/total assets 106.8% 357.1% 89.6% 14.6% 102.1% 34.7% 114.0% 52.5% 155.2% 995.6% 
total revenue/(interest 
income + non-interest income) 
94.1% 5.1% 92.7% 5.6% 94.6% 4.6% 95.1% 5.0% 94.7% 5.5% 
# bank-years 30,185 7,973 15,010 3,360 3,842 
# banks 5,281 1,683 3,002 893 816 
# years 7 7 7 7 7 
Notes: The columns captioned ‘mean’ report sample means, while the columns captioned ‘s.d.’ show sample standard deviations. All level variables are in thousands of 
$. We classify banks on the basis of their total output in 2017 prices. Size classes in prices of the year 2017: 1: less than $ 100 million, 2: $ 10 0–50 0 million, 3: $ 500 
million–1 billion and 4: $ 1 billion. Some banks switch from one size class to another over the years if their total output in 2017 prices changes. For this reason, the sum 






















5 Following Aizcorbe (1992) , we do not consider approximate separability such as 






βm,yy log (y ,it ) log (y m,it ) 
+ β ′ CF log (CF it ) + 
T ∑ 
s =2 
βs d s + ε it , (10)
with αi a bank-specific effect, d s a time dummy for year s =
2 , . . . , T , CF it a vector of control factors (such as the equity ratio),
and εit a zero-mean error term that is orthogonal to the regres-
sors. For output  = 1 , 2 , 3 , the marginal costs (MC) corresponding
to (10) equal 
MC ,it = 
c it 
y ,it 
∂ log c it 
∂ log y ,it 
= c it 
y ,it 
[




βk,wy log ( ̃  wk,it ) + 
∑ 
m> 
βm,yy log (y m,it ) 
]
. 
Aggregate cost function To calculate the aggregate Lerner index,
we estimate the following single-output aggregate translog cost
function in terms of total output or total assets ( y ): 
log ( ̃  c it ) = αi + 
4 ∑ 
j=2 
β j,w log ( ̃  w j,it ) + (1 / 2) 
4 ∑ 
j=2 







β jk,ww log ( ̃  w j,it ) log ( ̃  wk,it ) + 
4 ∑ 
j=2 
β j,wy log ( ̃  w j,it ) log (y it ) + βy log (y it ) 
+(1 / 2) βyy [ log (y it )] 2 +β ′ CF log (CF it ) + 
T ∑ 
s =2 
βs d s +ε it . (11)
uch a single-output aggregate translog cost function has been
sed in many Lerner studies in banking; see the studies listed in
he upper panel of Table 1 . The marginal costs corresponding to
11) equal 
C A,it = 
c it 
y it 
∂ log c it 
∂ log y it 









Conditions for separability in total output To test for separabil-
ty in total output, we must find the parameter restrictions un-
er which the multi-product-cost function in (10) reduces to the
ggregate cost function in (11) , with total output as the aggre-
ate output variable. 5 It is readily seen that no such parameter
onstraints exist; the two cost functions are non-nested. A formal
roof of this statement is given in Appendix C. 


























































































6 We used the All Urban Consumer Price Index for deflation; see Appendix A. 
7 Estimation results based on fixed-effect estimation are similar and available 
upon request. The non-nestedness implies that separability in total output
ill never hold; the multi-product translog cost function is either
eparable in a different aggregate output measure, or not separable
t all. This leads to the following result: 
esult 4.1. Assume that banks have a multi-product translog cost
unction c ( y, w ). Then c is not separable in total output 
∑ n 
j=1 y j 
nd L A in (5) is not consistently aggregated regardless of the single-
utput translog cost function c A used for L A . 
Result 4.1 follows directly from Result 3.1 , which states that
eparability in total output is a necessary condition for the ag-
regate Lerner index to be consistently aggregated. Result 4.1 tells
s that the aggregate Lerner index based on any single-output
ranslog cost function we may come up with is not consistently
ggregated. 
.2.2. Empirical specification: generalized Leontief 
We consider a multi-product cost function similar to the
on-homothetic generalized Leontief (NHT-GL) cost function of
uss (1977) . With four inputs and three outputs, the total input-
actor costs of bank i in year t are given by: 
 it = αi + 
4 ∑ 
j=1 






































β jm,wyy w j,it y ,it y m,it 
+ β ′ CF CF it + 
T ∑ 
s =2 
βs d s + ε it . (13) 
ere αi denotes a bank-specific effect, CF it a vector of control fac-
ors, d s a time dummy for year s = 2 , . . . , T and εit a zero-mean
rror term that is orthogonal to the regressors. The NHT-GL cost
unction is linearly homogeneous in input prices. The marginal
osts corresponding to (13) are given by 
C ,it = 
∂ c it 

















β j,wy w j,it + 
4 ∑ 
j=1 






β jm,wyy w j,it y m,it , (14) 
or output  = 1 , 2 , 3 . 
Aggregate cost function To calculate the aggregate Lerner index,
e also estimate the following single-output aggregate NHT-GL
ost function in terms of total output or total assets ( y ): 
 it = αi + 
4 ∑ 
j=1 













y it + 
4 ∑ 
j=1 





β j,wyy w j,it y 
2 
it + β ′ CF CF it + 
T ∑ 
s =2 
βs d s + ε it . (15) 
he marginal costs corresponding to (15) equal 
C A,it = 
∂ c it 

















β j,wy w j,it + 
4 ∑ 
j=1 
β j,wyy w j,it y it . (16) Conditions for separability in total output The aggregate NHT-
L cost function in (15) is a special case of the multi-
roduct NHT-GL cost function in (13) . As shown in Appendix
, the necessary parameter restrictions for separability in total





and β j,wy = β∗j,wy for some β∗j,wy ( j, k =
 , . . . , 4 ,  = 1 , 2 , 3 ). Under these 40 linearly independent con-
traints, the multi-product NHT-GL cost function in (14) reduces to
he aggregate NHT-cost function in (15) . We can test the parameter
onstraints using a Wald test. 
.3. Cost function estimation 
All cost functions are estimated in terms of deflated level vari-
bles and by using random-effects (RE) estimation. 6 The random
ffect αi in each specification captures bank-specific heterogeneity,
ncluding time-invariant cost inefficiencies, uncorrelated with the
ost function’s explanatory variables. Any remaining time-varying
ost inefficiencies are contained in the error term and do not have
o be specified any further for consistent estimation. In all specifi-
ations we include, both linearly and quadratically, bank age as a
ontrol factor to allow for different cost behavior of de novo banks
due to e.g. new technologies). We also include the equity ratio
s a control factor, with the interpretation of a quasi-fixed input
e.g., Mester, 1996 ). 7 The cost functions are estimated separately
or each of the four size classes. 
. Empirical results 
Our empirical analysis starts with the estimates of the relevant
erner indices: (i) L A and L 
e 
A 
(the aggregate Lerner indices), (ii)
 WA and L 
e 
WA 
(the weighted-average Lerner indices), (iii) L TLNS (the
erner index for total loans and leases), (iv) L TSEC (the Lerner index
or total securities) and (v) L OBS (the Lerner index for off-balance
heet activities). We will verify whether the estimated Lerner in-
ices pass an initial screening based on economic plausibility. Sub-
equently, we will turn to the empirical aggregate Lerner index,
est the three consistency conditions and investigate the economic
onsequences of using this index anyhow even if the consistency
onditions are rejected. 
.1. Estimated Lerner indices 
The estimated Lerner indices based on the NHT-GL cost function
re reported in Table 4 , while the estimated Lerner indices based
n the popular translog cost function are reported in Appendix D. 
Non-negativity Various studies have established some negative
alues for the estimated Lerner indices (e.g. Fonseca and González,
010; Jiménez et al., 2013; Coccorese, 2014; Huang et al., 2017 ). Be-
ause prices must weakly exceed marginal costs in equilibrium un-
er profit maximization, negative values may indicate that some-
hing is wrong. We therefore start with a negativity check on our
erner estimates. 
The figures in Table 4 make clear that the NHT-GL cost func-
ions hardly ever produce negative estimates of the Lerner indices
 WA , L 
e 
WA 
, L A , L 
e 
A 
, L TLNS and L OBS . Furthermore, for these Lerner in-
ices the percentage of significantly positive Lerner indices is al-
ost 100% in each size class. To save space, we will therefore only
nvestigate the Lerner index for securities in more detail. 
Because negative Lerner indices are only a potential concern if
hey are significantly negative, Table 5 provides detailed informa-
ion on the sign and significance of the estimated Lerner index for
10 S. Shaffer and L. Spierdijk / Journal of Banking and Finance 117 (2020) 105859 
Table 4 
Summary statistics (in %) for the estimated Lerner indices (NHT-GL). 
CLASS 1 CLASS 2 
L TLNS L TSEC L OBS L WA L 
e 
WA 
L A L 
e 
A 
L TLNS L TSEC L OBS L WA L 
e 
WA 
L A L 
e 
A 
mean 61.1 53.6 72.1 61.6 62.3 63.8 58.0 59.0 42.2 68.9 58.6 58.6 61.4 58.3 
median 62.8 57.0 73.2 63.0 63.7 65.3 59.3 60.2 46.6 70.7 59.7 59.8 62.5 59.7 
IQR 14.4 22.1 11.2 13.5 14.4 13.4 15.2 13.3 25.0 10.5 12.1 13.6 11.3 13.0 
5% quantile 40.0 16.2 53.8 42.9 43.2 44.1 37.2 40.6 -0.9 49.9 41.5 39.9 44.8 39.0 
95% quantile 76.5 77.7 85.7 75.8 77.4 78.4 74.5 73.5 70.3 81.1 71.9 73.1 73.8 72.8 
mean s.e. 2.0 6.7 8.3 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.7 5.9 4.7 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4 
# bank-years 7207 14241 
# banks 1597 2924 
CLASS 3 CLASS 4 
L TLNS L TSEC L OBS L WA L 
e 
WA 
L A L 
e 
A 
L TLNS L TSEC L OBS L WA L 
e 
WA 
L A L 
e 
A 
mean 60.0 50.1 74.9 61.9 61.8 67.3 68.0 62.5 33.3 68.9 60.9 61.0 67.5 67.8 
median 61.9 54.4 77.5 63.3 63.3 68.6 69.4 63.9 38.7 72.4 62.4 62.5 69.7 69.5 
IQR 13.1 26.3 13.5 11.3 12.7 9.7 12.0 13.3 30.5 19.2 12.2 12.8 11.0 10.9 
5% quantile 38.1 5.8 51.0 43.4 41.4 51.1 49.3 40.9 -16.3 36.0 40.9 40.5 48.3 48.6 
95% quantile 75.2 78.9 89.5 75.6 76.6 78.7 81.3 78.3 68.5 90.7 75.4 76.5 80.0 81.9 
mean s.e. 3.4 10.5 6.3 3.2 3.2 2.9 2.7 4.7 23.8 6.3 3.4 3.4 3.8 3.1 
# bank-years 3,208 3,487 
# banks 861 757 
Notes: For each size class, this table reports sample mean, median, interquartile range (IQR), 5% quantile and 95% quantile of the various 
estimated Lerner indices. The size classes in prices of the year 2017 are defined as: 1: less than $ 100 million, 2: $ 10 0–50 0 million, 
3: $ 500 million–1 billion and 4: $ 1 billion. In each size class, we still use 90–96% of the full sample for that class to calculate the 
summary statistics. The rows labeled ‘mean s.e.’ report the means of the bootstrap-based standard errors of the estimated Lerner indices, 
providing an indication of the amount of estimation uncertainty. The number of bank-year observations and included banks are reported 
on the basis of the amount used in the estimations (‘est.’) and in the calculation of the summary statistics (‘stat.’). To obtain the summary 
statistics, we leave out observations with product-specific output levels less than $ 10 0,0 0 0 (in prices of 2017) and output prices lower 
than 1%. We do this because the Lerner indices may become erratic for such small values. 
Table 5 
Significance of estimated Lerner indices for total securities 
(NHT-GL). 
CLASS 1 CLASS 2 CLASS 3 CLASS 4 
L TSEC < 0 0.2 1.9 0.4 0.3 
L TSEC > 0 93.2 88.8 85.4 51.9 
L TSEC > 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Notes: For each size class, this table reports the percentage of 
estimates of L TSEC that is significantly smaller than 0, signif- 
icantly larger than 0, and significantly larger than 1, respec- 
tively. To determine the significance, we have used a panel 
wild bootstrap with a chosen significance level of 5%. The 
summary statistics in this table are based on the same num- 
ber of bank-year observations as reported in Table 4 . Size 
classes in prices of the year 2017: 1: less than $ 100 million, 












































8 The amount of estimation uncertainty in the largest size class would be even 
larger if the 53 banks with total output in excess of $ 30 billion were included. On 
average, these banks have a total output of $ 329 billion, while their average total 
assets equal $ 241 billion. Although the other results remain about the same, these 
huge banks act as outliers in the sample and have a negative impact on the model 
fit. The results reported here for the largest size class do therefore not include these 
largest banks. securities. The first panel of this table shows that there are only
few bank-year observations for which this index turns out signifi-
cantly negative. Hence, negativity is not an issue for L TSEC . 
The second row of Table 5 nevertheless indicates that the per-
centage of significantly positive values of L TSEC varies between 85–
93% in the first three size classes, while this percentage is only
51.9% in the largest size class. Hence, in the largest size class a rel-
atively large fraction of the bank-year observations has a value of
L TSEC that does not significantly differ from 0. As part of our sanity
check, we provide an explanation for this phenomenon. 
The reduced significance of L TSEC in the largest size class reflects
a relatively large amount of estimation uncertainty. This estimation
uncertainty is also reflected by the large average standard error
of L TSEC in the largest size class, as reported in the row captioned
‘mean s.e.’ in Table 4 . The estimation uncertainty is caused by the
modest amount of bank-year observations in this size class and theelatively large amount of output dispersion causing heteroskedas-
icity. 8 
A related phenomenon is the size effect in the distribution of
 TSEC : the mean and median of L TSEC are substantially lower in the
argest size class than in the other size classes. This size effect is a
irect consequence of the estimation uncertainty in L TSEC . That is,
he size effect in the distribution of L TSEC disappears if we calculate
he sample means, medians and quantiles only over those bank-
ears for which L TSEC differs significantly from zero. 
As shown in Appendix D, the estimated Lerner indices for se-
urities based on the translog cost function suffer from a sub-
tantial negativity issue and much larger estimation uncertainty.
his is why we prefer the Lerner estimates based on the NHT-GL
ost functions and have relegated the translog estimates to the ap-
endix. In terms of the average values of the estimated Lerner in-
ices, however, the two cost function provide quite similar results.
Prior expectations As an additional sanity check, we verify
hether the estimated values of the product-specific Lerner in-
ices are in line with what we would expect on the basis of
he literature. For loans, we expect relatively high Lerner indices
ue the presence of locally limited borrowers ( Petersen and Ra-
an, 2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2004; Brevoort and Hannan, 2006;
o and Ishii, 2011 ) and loan screening and monitoring activities
 Ruckes, 2004 ), among others. Because loans are the main output
ategory for multi-product banks, we expect L WA to be similar to
 TLNS . 
Superficially, security markets may look highly competitive due
o the lack of entry barriers and the high degree of substitutabil-
ty of well-diversified portfolios. Yet the literature has shown that


































































Outcomes of Wald-test for separability in total output (NHT-GL). 
adj. R 2 test stat. d.f. 95% c.v. p -value 
CLASS 1 0.73 578.7 40 55.8 0.0000 
CLASS 2 0.75 771.7 40 55.8 0.0000 
CLASS 3 0.72 410.4 40 55.8 0.0000 
CLASS 4 0.84 1619.7 40 55.8 0.0000 
Notes: The non-homothetic Generalized Leontief (NHT-GL) cost 
function is defined in (13) and estimated separately for each size 
class. The size classes in prices of the year 2017 are defined as 1: 
less than $ 100 million, 2: $ 10 0–50 0 million, 3: $ 50 0 million–
1 billion and 4: $ 1 billion. The Wald test statistics are based on 
the NHT-GL coefficient estimates and the corresponding cluster- 
robust covariance matrices that are robust against heteroskedas- 
ticity and autocorrelation. The separability test involves 40 lin- 
early independent constraints, so the associated 95% critical value 
(‘c.v.’) is based on a χ2 distribution with 40 degrees of freedom 








































10 Measurement error in e.g. input prices is another source of potential misspec- symmetric information between investors may result in imper-
ect competition ( Grinblatt and Ross, 1985; Kyle, 1989; Holden
nd Subrahmanyam, 1992; Caballé and Krishnan, 1994; Back et al.,
0 0 0; Pasquariello, 20 07 ). Furthermore, in the presence of price
ncertainty, we expect positive Lerner indices even in competitive
arkets ( Sandmo, 1971 ). Because securities are typically subject to
iquidity, interest rate and default risk, we therefore expect to find
ositive Lerner indices for them. 
The value of the Lerner index for off-balance sheet activities is
ore of an empirical matter, because these bank activities tend to
e quite diverse across banks. Such heterogeneity suggests product
ifferentiation, which could promote market power and positive
erner indices. On the other hand, some off-balance sheet activities
ay be offered primarily as a service or convenience to customers
ho are already using other banking products. As such, they may
ometimes be priced at or below the bank’s cost, which would
end to zero or even negative Lerner indices. In general, we expect
hat retail and conventional intermediation activity will lead to rel-
tively high market power ( De Guevara and Maudos, 2007 ). There-
ore, we expect the Lerner indices for securities and off-balance
heet activities to be lower than for loans, on average. 
Several recent studies have established significant economies of
cale even for the largest banks and bank-holding companies (e.g.,
heelock and Wilson, 2012; Hughes and Mester, 2013; Wheelock
nd Wilson, 2018 ). In the presence of economies of scale, product-
pecific marginal-cost pricing would imply negative profits for the
rm. 9 In the presence of economies of scale, we may therefore ex-
ect relatively high Lerner indices for all outputs. Instead of at-
ributing the entire margin to market power, we should realize
hat positive Lerner indices may simply reflect banks’ need to earn
on-negative profits ( Lindenberg and Ross, 1981; Elzinga and Mills,
011; Spierdijk and Zaouras, 2018 ). 
Returning to the estimated Lerner indices in Table 4 , we ob-
erve fairly high product-specific Lerner indices for loans, securities
nd off-balance sheet activities, on average. Because we also estab-
ish economies of scale for most banks, the relatively high Lerner
ndices are consistent with our prior expectations. Table 4 shows
hat L TSEC has the lowest median value among the three product-
pecific Lerner indices, followed by L TLNS and L OBS , respectively. The
elatively low value of L TSEC is in line with our prior hypotheses.
e also confirm our initial expectation that L WA is largely driven
y L TLNS . 
Robustness We performed various robustness checks with re-
pect to the definition of revenue and recalculated the Lerner in-
ices for loans and securities in each case. For loans, we included
ains on the sales of loans (a form of non-intermediation income)
n the revenue as a robustness check. For securities, we consid-
red two alternative definitions of revenue. First, we excluded real-
zed trading gains (a form of non-intermediation income) from the
evenue. Second, we calculated the securities revenue as the sum
f securities income, realized trading gains and unrealized holding
ains on available-for-sale securities. These changes in the defini-
ions of the revenue for loans and securities did not substantially
lter the results. We also varied the definition of inputs and out-
uts and estimated three alternative cost functions. First, we esti-
ated a two-output cost function in line with Koetter et al. (2012) ,
hus omitting off-balance sheet items and only including loans and
ecurities. Second, we estimated a two-output cost function by ex-
luding securities and only including loans and off-balance sheet
tems. Third, we estimated a three-input cost function with a sin-
le input factor for borrowed funds, similar to Koetter et al. (2012) .
n the first two cases, we obtained similar Lerner estimates for the9 For a multi-product bank profit under marginal-cost pricing equals π = 
( 
∑ n 
k =1 e k − 1) , where e k denotes the cost elasticity with respect to the k th output. 
ence, profits are negative for 
∑ n 





emaining output factors as in the three-output case. In the third
ase, we found similar estimates as in the four-input case. Lastly,
e changed the stratification based on size classes by using sample
uartiles to form size classes. Also this change did not substantially
lter the results. 10 
.2. Consistency conditions 
Now that the Lerner estimates have passed our initial screen-
ng, we turn to the empirical aggregate Lerner index L e 
A 
and the
onditions that are required for its consistent aggregation. 
Statistical tests Table 6 reports the outcomes of the Wald test
or separability in total output, applied to the multi-product NHT-
L cost function for each size class. The Wald-tests are based on
luster-robust covariance matrices, making the test robust to het-
roskedasticity and serial correlation in the cost functions’ error
erms. The adjusted R 2 for each estimated NHT-GL cost function
s also reported in Table 6 . 11 For each size class and at each rea-
onable significance level, the necessary parameter restrictions for
eparability in total output are rejected. This finding is in line with
ur prior expectation based on the existing literature that separa-
ility is an “extremely restrictive” requirement. 
As explained in Section 3.2 , conditions [EQ1] and [EQ2] do not
old in the intermediation model of banking. This can be statisti-
ally illustrated by running paired-samples Wilcoxon signed-rank
ests. More precisely, to statistically test condition [EQ1] (condi-
ion [EQ2] ) in a non-parametric way, we use the Wilcoxon test
o assess whether the distribution of the difference between to-
al output and total assets (between total revenue and INI income)
as median 0. If we reject the null hypothesis of a zero median,
e reject the statistical equivalence of the two series. For all size
lasses, both paired-samples Wilcoxon signed-rank tests reject the
ull hypothesis that the distribution of the difference has median 0
t each reasonable significance level. Hence, conditions [EQ1] and
EQ1] are both statistically rejected for all size classes. 
The non-equivalence between total assets and total output is
urther illustrated by the summary statistics for the ratio of total
utput to total assets in Table 3 , which ranges on average between
0%–155%. The second largest size class has an average value be-
ow 100%, which shows that the effect of including fixed assetsfication. We leave it as a topic for future research to analyze the extent to which 
uch errors are present in banking data and affect the estimation results. 
11 The complete estimation results for the multi-product and aggregate cost func- 
ions consist of many coefficients and are not reported to save space. They are avail- 
ble upon request. 
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Fig. 1. Histogram for the relative difference (L e 
A 
− L WA ) /L WA for banks in the largest size class Notes: This figure shows a histogram for the relative difference (L e A − L WA ) /L WA 































Sample distribution of | L e 
A 
− L WA | /L WA (NHT-GL). 
5% Q 50% Q 95% Q mean 
CLASS 1 0.5% 5.7% 24.8% 9.0% 
CLASS 2 0.4% 4.2% 19.5% 6.3% 
CLASS 3 1.2% 9.5% 37.3% 13.2% 
CLASS 4 1.5% 10.2% 38.5% 11.9% 
Notes: For each size class, this table reports sample 
statistics for the relative difference | L e 
A 
− L WA | /L WA 
(in %). The reported statistics are the 5%, 50% and 
95% sample quantiles and the sample mean. Size 
classes in prices of the year 2017: 1: less than 
$ 100 million, 2: $ 10 0–50 0 million, 3: $ 500 


















1  in total assets outweighs the effect of not including off-balance
sheet activities, on average. The largest size class has the largest
average value, illustrating the more substantial output share of off-
balance sheet activities for the largest banks. Also the dispersion
in the ratio of total output to total assets is relatively large in this
size class. Similarly, the non-equivalence between the sum of the
product-specific revenues and INI income is illustrated by the sum-
mary statistics for the ratio of the latter two variables. This ratio is
around 95% on average, showing that INI income exceeds the sum
of the product-specific revenue on average due to the included ser-
vice fees on deposits. 
On the basis of Result 3.2 , we conclude that the empirical
aggregate Lerner index L e 
A 
is not consistently aggregated; condi-
tions [SEP], [EQ1] and [EQ2] are rejected. Because of Result 3.1 , we
conclude that also the ‘theoretical’ aggregate Lerner index L A is not
consistently aggregated. This is important to know since L A can be
viewed as a ‘repaired’ version of L e 
A 
that is subject to the separabil-
ity condition only. Furthermore, the rejection of consistency condi-
tion [EQ2] implies that the empirical weighted-average Lerner in-
dex L e 
WA 
is not consistently aggregated either. This is also important
to know, because the latter Lerner index has been recently used in
the empirical banking literature; see the lower panel of Table 1 . 
Discrepancies between L e 
A 




aggregated for our sample of banks, Result 3.2 tells us that L e 
A 
 =
L WA . We summarize the sample distribution of | L e A − L WA | /L WA in
Table 7 to illustrate the discrepancies between L e 
A 
and L WA caused
by the inconsistent aggregation of the former index. We observe
that the value of the relative difference is between 6–13% on aver-
age. The 95% sample quantiles indicate that more extreme differ-
ences may also occur; in the largest size class the 95% quantile of
the relative difference equals 38.5%. 
Fig. 1 visualizes the unsigned relative differences between L e 
A 
and L WA by showing a histogram of (L 
e − L WA ) /L WA for banks inA he largest class. We observe that L e 
A 
tends to be larger than L WA 
or most observations in this sample. 
In Appendix D, we show that the discrepancies between L e 
A 
and
 WA are mostly due to the rejected consistency conditions [SEP]
nd [EQ1] rather than the rejected condition [EQ2] . 




ecause it represents the value L e 
A 
would have under consistent ag-
regation. We therefore study the potential economic implications
f using L e 
A 
instead of L WA . Fig. 2 displays L 
e 
A 
and L WA during the
011–2017 period for one particular bank. For this bank, the dif-
erence between the two Lerner indices is substantial. Apart from
he difference in value between L e 
A 
and L WA , this figure also shows
hat the two Lerner indices do not always agree on the direction
f trend in the price-cost margin over the years. Fig. 3 compares
he Lerner indices L e 
A 
and L WA of the same bank (‘bank 1’) to those
f another bank (‘bank 2’) from the same size class. On the basis
f the inconsistently aggregated L e 
A 
, we would conclude that bank
 is more successful in raising prices above marginal costs, while
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Fig. 2. L e 
A 
and L WA for one specific bank from the largest size class Notes: This figure shows L 
e 
A 
and L WA for one specific bank (‘bank 1’) from the largest size class, where the 
red line applies to L e 
A 
and the black line to L WA . 
Fig. 3. L e 
A 
and L WA for two different banks from the largest size class Notes: This figure shows L 
e 
A 
and L WA for two different banks in the largest size class: bank 1 as in 
Fig. 2 and another bank referred to as ‘bank 2’. The solid (bank 1) and dashed (bank 2) red lines apply to L e 
A 
, while the solid (bank 1) and dashed (bank 2) black lines apply 















a  e tend to conclude the opposite on the basis of the consistently
ggregated L WA . 
Robustness As mentioned before, our empirical application to
.S. banks is based on specific choices regarding inputs, outputs
nd the functional form of the cost function. We have already
hown that the estimated Lerner values are robust to the spec-
fication changes mentioned in Section 5.1 . Also the results re-
arding the rejection of the consistency conditions turn out ro-
ust to these changes. Qualitatively speaking, this also holds for
c  he possible economic implications of the rejected consistency
onditions. 
. Conclusions 
The aggregate Lerner index is widely used a measure of banks’
arket power in the empirical banking literature, on total assets
s the single aggregate output factor. We have shown that the
onsistent aggregation of the aggregate Lerner index depends on































































































three consistency conditions. If these conditions hold, the aggre-
gate Lerner index reduces to a weighted-average of the product-
specific Lerner indices. Otherwise, the aggregate Lerner index is
not consistently aggregated and may lead to incorrect economic
conclusions 
Although one of the above conditions has been described as
“extremely restrictive” in the literature, whether the three condi-
tions hold for a given sample is ultimately an empirical matter.
We have therefore provided an empirical application to U.S. multi-
product banks observed during the 2011–2017 period. Our empir-
ical strategy to test for consistent aggregation has shown that all
three conditions are statistically rejected. Consequently, the aggre-
gate Lerner index is not consistently aggregated for this sample.
We have shown that the inconsistent aggregation may cause eco-
nomically relevant distortions to the aggregate Lerner index, de-
pending on the economic context. 
Our analysis raises the question why the aggregate index should
be used in the first place. The user of this index should at least
verify whether it is consistently aggregated for the particular sam-
ple at hand, which requires the calculation of the components of
the always consistently aggregated weighted-average Lerner index.
An additional complication is that some cost functions (such as the
translog) are never separable in total output. Based on such a cost
function, the aggregate Lerner index is a priori known to be incon-
sistently aggregated. Although such cost functions could still pro-
vide a good fit to the data, they are unsuitable for the purpose of
estimating the aggregate Lerner index. 
How to go from here? The most efficient strategy is to omit
the aggregate Lerner index altogether and to work with the always
consistently aggregated weighted-average Lerner index whenever a
composite Lerner index is required. Because the weighted-average
Lerner index is consistently aggregated regardless of the underly-
ing cost function, it can simply be based on a cost function that
fits the data well without concerns about this function’s separa-
bility properties. We recommend using the product-specific Lerner
indices if there is no particular need for a composite Lerner in-
dex, because the former indices are by definition more informative
about multi-product banks’ market power than a composite index.
Inconsistent aggregation could also occur if single-output non-
Lerner measures of market power are used under the assumption
that total assets (or another measure of aggregate output) is the
single aggregate output factor. Similar issues may arise if a sum-
mary measure of banks’ market power in different product markets
is created. In such cases, we recommend to extend the concept of
a consistently aggregated Lerner index to the chosen measure of
market power and to verify whether the summary measure is con-
sistently aggregated. Because the details of such an extension are
highly case specific, we leave this as a topic for future research. 
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found, in the online version, at doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105859 . 
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